

ISSN 2414-228X

# ReveLA

Realidades y visiones sobre **Latinoamérica**

Edición/Ausgabe #7

12.2017

¿Posconflicto? Y Procesos de paz -  
Miradas desde las experiencias latinoamericanas

Postkonflikt? Und Friedensprozesse -  
Erfahrungen aus der Sicht Lateinamerikas

Revista ReveLA #7

ISSN 2414-228X

Posconflicto? Y Procesos de paz -  
Miradas desde las experiencias  
latinoamericanas\*

---

Postkonflikt? Und Friedensprozesse -  
Erfahrungen aus der Sicht Lateinamerikas\*

Viena, Austria  
Diciembre de 2017  
Revista digital

Wien, Österreich  
Dezember 2017  
online Zeitschrift

[www.revistarevela.com](http://www.revistarevela.com)  
[revela.viena@gmail.com](mailto:revela.viena@gmail.com)

Verein *ReveLA. Realidades y Visiones sobre Latinoamérica,*  
*Plattform für interkulturellen Wissensaustausch*

Producción editorial | Redaktion:  
Equipo editorial y creador ReveLA | Redaktionsteam ReveLA

Portada | Cover: Natalia Sie (página 15 | Seite 15)

\*Der Inhalt widerspiegelt der Artikel nicht unbedingt den der Revista

\*El contenido de los distintos artículos es responsabilidad de sus autores y no necesariamente refleja la opinión de la Revista ReveLA



## Aus der Redaktion

Liebe Leserinnen und Leser,

Im Laufe des Jahres 2017 hat das Kreativ- und Redaktionsteam von ReveLA zwei Mitglieder in die Ferne verabschiedet: Carolina und Rossana. In einer modernen und globalisierten Welt beschränkt sich diese Distanzierung jedoch auf die rein physische Ebene, denn vom amerikanischen Kontinent aus unterstützen die beiden weiterhin die Entfaltung und Entwicklung dieses Projekts. Gleichzeitig kamen zwei Kolleginnen aus dem Universitätslehrgang für Interdisziplinäre Lateinamerikastudien dazu, um das ReveLA Team zu bereichern: Celina und Sandra, die wir hiermit herzlich willkommen heißen.

Bei der Veranstaltung zur Präsentation der 6. Ausgabe am 8. März 2017 mit dem zentralen Thema „Frauen und Feminismus. Beiträge aus Lateinamerika“ durften wir mit der Teilnahme und Unterstützung wichtiger Gäste rechnen, Autor\_innen, die unser Magazin ausgewählt haben, um ihre wissenschaftlichen oder journalistischen Arbeiten zu publizieren und ihre Beiträge auf künstlerische, poetische und musikalische Weise gestalteten. Die Veranstaltung fand im Mexikanischen Kulturinstitut in Wien, Österreich, statt, kulinarisch wurden wir mit mexikanischen Köstlichkeiten verwöhnt und es war ein voller Erfolg.

Einmal jährlich bringt die Zeitschrift ReveLA eine Sonderausgabe heraus, die sich auf die Arbeit einer einzigen Autorin oder eines einzigen Autors konzentriert. Für das erste Halbjahr 2018 ist die Publikation der zweiten Sonderausgabe vorgesehen, die diesmal Fausto gewidmet ist, der sich mit dem höchstaktuellen Thema der „Lebensmittelverschwendung“ anhand seines Textes „Ein Tag im Leben eines Foodsharing-Aktivisten“ beschäftigt. Illustriert wird dieser Beitrag mit Fotos von Alexandra Yepes. Darüber hinaus werden in dieser Sonderausgabe auch andere soziale Initiativen vorgestellt, die sich mit der Thematik in den verschiedensten Regionen Lateinamerikas befassen.

In der ersten Ausgabe 2018, die bereits die achte von ReveLA sein wird, werden wir uns auf das Thema Bildung konzentrieren und uns die zentrale Frage stellen: Welche Rolle spielt „Bildung im Zuge der sozialen Transformation Lateinamerikas. Erfahrungen und Herausforderungen“.

Das Jahr 2018 verspricht spannend und voller neuer Projekte zu werden, die sich – so hoffen wir – im Laufe des Jahres mit der Unterstützung von möglichst vielen von euch verwirklichen werden.

Wir wünschen euch eine spannende Lektüre dieser siebten Ausgabe von ReveLA.

*Luciana Camuz Ligios*  
**Redaktionsteam ReveLA**



## Editorial

Querid@s lector@s,

A lo largo de este 2017 el equipo creativo y redactor de ReveLa ha experimentado cambios geográficos de dos de sus miembros; Carolina y Rossana. Sin embargo este hecho en un mundo moderno y globalizado implica tan sólo un distanciamiento físico, ya que ellas siguen aportando al crecimiento y evolución de este proyecto desde el continente americano. Al mismo tiempo han llegado para enriquecer al equipo ReveLA dos colegas latinoamericanistas más: Celina y Sandra, a quienes les queremos dar nuestra más sincera bienvenida.

En el evento de lanzamiento de la sexta edición del día 8 de marzo del 2017 con el tema central “Mujeres y feminismos. Lecturas desde Latinoamérica”, contamos con la participación de valiosos invitados; autores que eligieron nuestra revista para publicar sus trabajos científicos o periodísticos y que brindaron su aporte desde lo artístico, poético y musical. El evento tuvo lugar en el Instituto Cultural Mexicano en Viena, Austria, nos deleitamos con la gastronomía mexicana y fue todo un éxito.

Anualmente la Revista ReveLA publica una edición especial donde apoya el trabajo de un solo autor o autora. Para la primera mitad del 2018 proyectamos la publicación de la segunda edición especial, la cual estará abocada a brindar el espacio a Fausto, quien desarrollará la temática actual de los mal llamados “desechos de la comida” por medio de sus textos en “Un día en la vida de un activista de Foodsharing” y apoyado por fotografías de Alexandra Yepes. Esa segunda edición contará además con información sobre iniciativas civiles relacionadas con este tema y que se llevan a cabo en diferentes regiones de Latinoamérica.

Para la primera edición del 2018, la octava de ReveLA, nos enfocaremos en la educación, planteando como pregunta central “La educación en la transformación social de Latinoamérica. Experiencias y desafíos”.

El 2018 promete venir lleno de nuevos proyectos, que esperamos se vayan realizando a lo largo del año y podamos contar con el aporte de muchos de ustedes.

Esperamos disfruten de esta séptima edición de la Revista ReveLA.

*Luciana Camuz Ligios  
Equipo Editorial ReveLA*

## Rubrik

# Wissenschaft

In dieser Ausgabe der ReveLA widmet sich die wissenschaftliche Sektion aktuellen Fragen der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung im Kontext Lateinamerikas. Das Verständnis von Frieden und Konflikt, das wir hier vorangestellt haben, ist ein kritisch-gesellschaftswissenschaftliches. Konflikt ist eine grundlegende und unvermeidliche Dimension sozialer Verhältnisse, die auf der Existenz von Hierarchien, Ausschlüssen und Herrschaft beruhen. Frieden bedeutet aus einer solchen Perspektive daher nicht einfach bloß die Abwesenheit militärischer bzw. bewaffneter Kampfhandlungen, sondern dieser Begriff ist mit dem Stand der Bedingungen verknüpft, in denen die antagonistischen Prozesse der Herrschaft und der Befreiung von Herrschaft aktuell zueinander stehen. Diese Bedingungen finden sich wesentlich nicht bloß auf der Ebene des Staates und seiner Apparate, sondern auch auf der Ebene der sozialen Praxis. Klassen, Geschlechterverhältnisse, rassistische Ausschlüsse sind relevante Aspekte dieser Betrachtung.

Gregor Seidl beschäftigt sich auf einer affekttheoretischen Grundlage mit den Prozessen des staatlichen Terrors seitens der in den 1970er Jahren regierenden Militärdiktatur Argentiniens, und mit den Möglichkeiten einer Wiederherstellung der Handlungsfähigkeit sozialer Bewegungen durch Politiken der Trauer und des Erinnerns.

Tatiana Giraldo widmet sich einer ungeheuer relevanten, oft vernachlässigten Dimension asymmetrischer Machtverhältnisse im Rahmen von Friedensprozessen, nämlich dem genderspezifischen Ausschluss von Frauen und der Rolle der geschlechterräumlichen Trennung des Öffentlichen und des Privaten in diesem Zusammenhang.

Jovhanna Tovar beschreibt in ihrem Beitrag die Problematiken, Hürden und Hindernisse des Friedensprozesses in Kolumbien am ausgewählten Fall des aktuellen Friedensabkommens zwischen der kolumbianischen Regierung und der größten Guerillaorganisation des Landes, der FARC ( Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia).

*Gregor Seidl*  
*Redaktionsteam ReveLA*



## Sección Científica

Esta vez, la sección científica de la revista ReveLA está dedicada a temas actuales de paz y conflictos en el contexto latinoamericano. Priorizamos –en el abordaje de la conflictividad y la pacificación– un enfoque crítico desde las ciencias sociales. En este sentido, los conflictos son una dimensión inherente de las relaciones sociales, que se fundamenta en la existencia de jerarquías, exclusiones y dominación. Por tanto, la paz no implica exclusivamente la ausencia de confrontaciones bélicas, sino también se entretiene con las condiciones concretas de los antagonismos de dominación y liberación. Estas condiciones se expresan, por un lado, en el Estado y su andamiaje de poder y, por otro lado, también en la praxis social: clases sociales, relaciones de género y exclusiones racistas son aspectos relevantes en esta perspectiva.

Gregor Seidl aborda –desde un enfoque teórico-afectivo– el terror estatal de las dictaduras militares en Argentina en la década de 1970, reflexionando sobre la influencia de políticas de duelo y memoria en los procesos de reconstitución de movimientos (y activismos) sociales.

Tatiana Giraldo escribe sobre un tema muy relevante, aunque muchas veces marginado en las asimetrías de poder de los propios procesos de pacificación: la exclusión de género de mujeres y el rol de la dicotomía entre espacios públicos y privados.

Jovhanna Tovar dedica su ensayo a las problemáticas y obstáculos del proceso de paz en Colombia; en concreto, el caso del actual acuerdo de paz entre el gobierno colombiano y la organización guerrillera más grande del país, las FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia).

*Gregor Seidl*  
*Equipo de Redacción ReveLA*



## A Controversial Path to Peacebuilding:

### *The Peace Process with the FARC in Colombia and the Domestic Factors that Influenced the Results of the Referendum*

*Jovhanna Tovar\**

After more than 60 years of armed conflict in Colombia, in August 2016, President Juan Manuel Santos signed a peace agreement with one of the most important guerrilla groups existing in Latin America, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). From the start of the negotiations in 2012, the President made clear that the peace accord must be ratified by popular vote. Thus, on 2nd October 2016, Colombian citizens were called to participate in a plebiscite and to support a peace deal that would bring the end of an insurgent group responsible for a majority of terrorist actions in the country's history.

The results came as a surprise not only for the supporters of the referendum but also for the government and the international community. This astonishment is visible in the following headlines from several international media sources:

“Colombians narrowly reject FARC peace deal in surprising referendum upset”<sup>1</sup>

“In Surprise Result, Colombian Voters Reject Peace Deal”<sup>2</sup>

“Surprise as Colombians shun peace deal”<sup>3</sup>

Being Colombian myself, I was confronted with two questions: why was the referendum rejected and why did the results generate surprise? These concerns guided and motivated me to write not only my master thesis but also to publish this article. Thus, the aim of this text is to provide a brief but compact analysis of the voting behaviour and the referendum results.

Before starting, it is necessary to look closer at the social and economic impacts in order to understand the conflict and the importance of its potential ending.

With regard to the social impact, the use of violence towards the civil society is what makes the conflict

particularly relevant to address, not only by the government but also by international organizations such as the United Nations, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, non-governmental organizations and foreign governments. Records show that there were 260,000 persons killed, 45,000 individuals reported missing and 6.8 million persons displaced by the conflict<sup>4</sup>.


One should also not refrain from looking at the setup and structure of the guerrilla organisation itself. In 1998, the total number of combatants from the FARC comprised around 21,000 individuals, but since 2012 it dropped to 7,000<sup>5</sup>. Around 35 and 40 percent were women<sup>6</sup> and some of them have suffered abuse, forced abortions/sterilizations and prostitution<sup>7</sup>. According to the government, between 1979 and 2014 the FARC recruited 11,556 children (younger than fifteen years) who were trained and fought as insurgents<sup>8</sup>.

Regarding the economic impact, as stated by Saab and Taylor, it is interesting to note that in 2003 the FARC's annual income was estimated to be around 200 to 300 million dollars, with 45 percent of this amount deriving from the drug business, 37 percent from extortions imposed on business companies and individuals, 9 percent from kidnappings and 6 percent from livestock forced appropriation<sup>9</sup>.

It is worth to highlight that the cocaine business flourished particularly during the 1990s. It is estimated that coca growing areas increased from 37,500 hectares to 144,807, from the year 1992 to 2001<sup>10</sup>. By 2000, Colombia produced 74% of the coca leaves worldwide<sup>11</sup> and as the authors Peceny and Durnan point out, the cocaine production and trade helped the FARC to gain access to economic resources that enabled them to strengthen their capability to fight<sup>12</sup>.



Figure 1. How Colombia's provinces voted in 2016



Source: BBC<sup>18</sup>

Figure 2. FARC's presence in Colombia in 2014



Source: published by The Washington Post but provided by the Foundation for Peace and Reconciliation<sup>19</sup>

when “the necessary reforms and changes are carried out and contribute to the construction of a country with less inequalities and social injustice”<sup>17</sup>.

Until today, this thought has remained alive in the Colombian population and this can be seen in the way how voters were influenced before the referendum. For example, for a large group of citizens, the agreement was not acceptable as the FARC continued to carry out attacks such as explosions of electricity towers and

### The Referendum and the Results

“Peace process opponents justify their vote arguing that they are friends of peace, but they are not willing to accept the way Santos is trying to achieve it, even more when impunity will come along with it”<sup>13</sup>

On the 2nd of October 2016, the government held a public referendum in order to ratify the peace agreement. The plebiscite only contained a single yes or no question, namely **do you support the final agreement to end the conflict and build a lasting peace?** 34.89 million Colombians were eligible to vote but only 13 million individuals went to the polls, 50.21 percent voted against the motion and 49.78 percent in favour<sup>14 15</sup>. As it was also the case with the ‘Brexit’ in Great Britain, there was not enough participation of the population for the agreement to be endorsed, although the polls conducted before the 2nd of October had shown the contrary<sup>16</sup>.

To understand the results, it is necessary to analyse the factors that influenced the results of the referendum within a domestic context.

#### Domestic context

It is important for us to ask, if the Colombian society was sufficiently prepared for a peace agreement after decades of violence, mistrust and failed peace talks. Leguizamo already discussed this question in connection with the Ex-President Andres Pastrana’s peace negotiations. He declares that for one part of the population, peace means “stopping the armed conflict” but for the other part, peace will only come

pipelines during the time the peace talks were taking place. Another group of voters did not accept an agreement that did not include unsolved problems which continue to be crucial for the future of the country, such as poverty outside the conflict areas.

The conflict itself is already a complex subject that involves the understanding of different aspects such as the participation of different groups, the history of Colombian politics, illicit drug production and trade, social inequalities, the lack of a solid justice system, among others. In the very same way, the results of the referendum are also difficult to understand for outsiders or even for Colombians without an existing knowledge of the previous topics. In addition, it is imperative to analyse the electoral participation, the reasons for constituencies to vote for ‘no’, and to review of the information behind the ‘no’ campaign that saturated the media before the 2nd of October 2016.

With regard to the electoral participation, the results of the referendum show that voters in urban areas (largely populated and located in the center of the country) voted against the accord, while voters in rural, more isolated areas that are closer the conflict supported the agreement.


If we compare figures 1 and 2 in this article, it becomes evident that the populations living under the FARC presence, particularly in the provinces of Vaupes or Choco decided to support the agreement. For example, Choco is one of the regions that has been most heavily affected by the conflict, the indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities living there



have been afflicted by the presence of the FARC, the paramilitaries, drug trafficking and illegal mining<sup>20</sup>.

With regard to the citizens living abroad, the government did not have enough time to logistically organize the ballot boxes. Hence they decided that only individuals who registered their identification numbers for the previous presidential elections were able to vote at the Colombian consulates or embassies. Thus, from 6 million Colombians living abroad, only 10 percent voted. The remaining 90 percent did not cast their ballot, mostly because they could not or abstained themselves from doing it<sup>21</sup>.

**Figure 3. Results of the Digital Plebiscite**



Source: Democracy Earth Foundation<sup>22</sup>

It is worth mentioning that several civil society organizations created a ‘digital plebiscite’ that encouraged voters to participate and let their opinion still be heard, even if their votes were symbolic and not official. In the digital plebiscite, the organizations not only included the main question but also asked users (around 7,000 participants) to vote for each point of the agreement.

As it is visible in Figure 3, most of the digital voters were in favour of the peace process but did not agree with FARC’s participation in Colombian politics. Is it possible to find a correlation between the results of the digital plebiscite and the official referendum outcome? Yes. The digital plebiscite shows important information i.e., a **‘no’ vote does not mean a ‘no’ to the peace**, but in this case, it means a ‘no’ to the

political participation of a group that has committed crimes against civil society, is financially wealthy and is able obtain power within corrupted and weak political and legal systems.

Are there other reasons for constituents to vote ‘no’ on the peace agreement?

With the creation of a special ‘Tribunal for Peace’ voters felt that the members of the FARC (especially those that committed serious crimes or high-level decision makers) will receive short sentences, thus they believed that insurgents will “get away with murder”<sup>23</sup>. One assumption that could therefore be made is that the political participation is not the sole controversial subject. In fact, it is likely that also the issue of transitional justice defined in the peace agreement influenced voters.

In a survey carried out among 1,200 interviewees before the referendum took place, individuals were asked if they believed that the government would comply with the main objectives of the accord, including the fulfilment of the agreement by the FARC and the state, the attainment of peace and the end of drug trafficking. The results, which are depicted in Figure 4, should


not surprise the reader as they convey the scepticism and antipathy that have predominated from past peace talks until today in the Colombian society.

The following statement by Herbolzheimer reflects perhaps best the results of the poll:

“Despite all the positive developments in the peace process, Colombian public opinion remains largely skeptical. People simply do not trust the government and the FARC to deliver on their promises”<sup>25</sup>

Are Colombians aware of the necessary efforts involved in the peace process? Are they aware of how a political solution can be achieved or what the cost of the war after years of violence is? If they had known, would they have ratified the agreement? What is certain, is that the FARC made clear that they will not negotiate time in prison and political participation, making it

**Figure 4. Poll Results Around the Objectives of the Agreement**



Source: *Investigación y Asesoría de Mercadeo (INVAMER)*, translated by Jovhanna Tovar<sup>24</sup>

impossible to comply with the demands of the deal’s opponents<sup>26</sup>. Additionally, a large part of the citizens did not read the 297 pages of the agreement or did not have proper interpretation, and –as Restrepo points out– each act of terror, each death and each criminal action helped to build up distrust and opposition against the FARC and the plebiscite<sup>27 28</sup>.

The campaigns to vote ‘no’ or ‘yes’ in the referendum had an emotional impact on the people and created political polarization. This division intensified when Ex-President Uribe publicly condemned the agreement and confronted the current president by saying “we can say yes to peace by voting no to the referendum”<sup>29</sup>. Colombians started to identify with the perspective of Uribe or Santos and in this way the plebiscite became a form of showing support or opposition to the presidents. As Flórez mentions, the principal challenge of the referendum was the incorrect polarization of “Santos vs. Uribe” and not its true meaning “reconciliation vs. violence”<sup>30</sup>.

Another aspect that influenced the ‘no’ campaign was the narrative of ‘*Castro-Chavismo*’ that was transmitted. It suggested that Colombia will end up as a communist country under leaders comparable to Fidel Castro in Cuba and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela if political participation was granted to the FARC. The images coming from Venezuela e.g. citizens queuing to get access to food, shortage of basic nutrition, unemployment, expropriations of private property, etc. frightened voters. Accordingly, many people feared that the entering of a communist group into politics would mean the end of democracy and separation of powers, as it had happened in Venezuela<sup>31</sup>.

Behind this narrative, there is also the memory of the continuous fight against communism. Two examples are the political genocide of the Colombian communist party ‘Union Patriótica’ in the late 1980s and the creation of paramilitaries to fight guerrilla groups. Thus, the ‘no’ to Castro-Chavismo became a synonym for ‘communism will not have the chance to win if the agreement is rejected’<sup>32</sup>.

Other aspects of misleading information associated with the ‘no’ campaign include the assertion that with the

political participation of the FARC, marriage of same sex couples will be accepted, that an educational handbook (usually prepared by the ministry of education for children) will contain information viewing same gender relationships as something acceptable, and that the transport service company ‘Uber’ will be legalized in Colombia, a country where taxi ownership is high. In addition, despite the Holy See’s official support for the peace treaty, some leaders of both the Protestant and Catholic churches organized gatherings to express disagreement with the accord and encouraged people to vote ‘no’ at the referendum. With 79 percent of the population being declared Catholics and 13 percent Protestants, it could be anticipated that such campaign would have an impact on the population; especially the narrative of a new gender ideology vs. the traditionally family set-up was expected to influence members of the religious groups. In summary, opponents of the agreement tried to mobilize large groups in different sectors of society, where individuals were more inclined to vote so as to reject an ideology that goes against their values<sup>33 34 35</sup>.

After the plebiscite, the government held three rounds of negotiations. The first one included the government and the opposition. The second involved representatives of civil society who supported the accord and the government, and the last round took place between the FARC and the government. After the rounds, the government and the FARC approved a new agreement that included “58 per cent of the opposition’s original public proposals” which were covered either “completely<sup>31</sup> or partially” in the sections

regarding comprehensive rural reform, political participation, end of the conflict, solution to the illicit drugs problem, and the victims.

With regard to transitional justice, the new agreement specifies that the liberty of individuals who are accused of having preformed criminal actions will be restricted to specific areas under United Nations observation, while they must perform activities that contribute to a reparation of the victims. Still, the opposition argued that the changes were primarily related to the wording and were more superficial than significant. The FARC did not negotiate the granted seats in the Senate and House of Representatives or the conditions under which ex militants can hold public offices. As the opposition continued to reject the agreement, so did the 'no' voters<sup>36</sup>.

It is undeniable that the ratification of a complicated peace agreement via public referendum (with only one question) proved to be rather an obstacle than a support to the peace process. Essentially, it intensified the polarization between supporters and opponents of the negotiations with the FARC guerilla group. Although the agreement was rejected via plebiscite, the Constitutional Court authorized its ratification through congressional vote. Congress approved the deal with a few changes in November 2016. Since 1st of December 2016, the accord is being implemented by the Colombian government, which is confronted with an increasing amount of political pressure, especially with presidential and parliamentary elections coming up in 2018. While many people remain anxious about what is going to happen in the post-conflict period, others expect a new era of stability, economic growth and prosperity for Colombia.

### Bibliography

1. n.a., "Colombians narrowly reject FARC peace deal in surprising referendum upset." DW, 02 Oct 2016. Accessed from: <http://www.dw.com/en/colombians-narrowly-reject-farc-peace-deal-in-surprising-referendum-upset/a-35944923> [27 Feb 2017]
2. Otis John, "In Surprise Result, Colombian Voters Reject Peace Deal." NPR, 02 Oct 2016. Accessed from: <http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/10/02/496299856/colombians-go-to-the-polls-with-one-question-in-mind-war-or-peace> [27 Feb 2017]
3. n.a., "Surprise as Colombians shun peace deal." BBC, 03 Oct 2016. Accessed from: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37545327> [27 Feb 2017]
4. n.a., "FARC rebels face tricky return to Colombia under peace deal". TRT World, 26 Aug 2016. Accessed from: [http://www.trtworld.com/americas/farc-rebels-face-tricky-return-to-](http://www.trtworld.com/americas/farc-rebels-face-tricky-return-to-colombia-under-peace-deal-173348)

[colombia-under-peace-deal-173348](http://www.trtworld.com/americas/farc-rebels-face-tricky-return-to-colombia-under-peace-deal-173348) [27 Feb 2017]

5. Fernandez Covadonga and Alejandra de Vengoechea, "Proceso de Paz en Colombia". *Ahora Semanal*, 08 Apr 2016. Accessed from: <https://www.ahorasemanal.es/proceso-de-paz-en-colombia> [27 Feb 2017]
6. n.a., Mujeres de las FARC: "Cargamos ametralladoras igual que los hombres". RT, 14 Oct 2013. Accessed from: <https://actualidad.rt.com/actualidad/view/108419-farc-guerrilleras-mujeres-portal> [27 Feb 2017]
7. n.a., "Las Farc y la violencia sexual". *El Espectador*, 09 Apr 2015. Accessed from: <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/farc-y-violencia-sexual-articulo-554120> [27 Feb 2017]
8. n.a., "En 39 años, 11.556 niños han sido reclutados por las Farc". *El Tiempo*, 16 May 2016. Accessed from: <http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/justicia/la-fiscalia-revelo-que-11556-ninos-han-sido-reclutados-por-las-farc/16594500> [27 Feb 2017]
9. Saab Bilal Y. and Alexandra W. Taylor, "Criminality and Armed Groups: A Comparative Study of FARC and Paramilitary Groups in Colombia". *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 32, No. 6 (2009): p. 463
10. Diaz Ana Maria and Fabio Sanchez, "Geografía de los Cultivos Ilícitos y Conflicto Armado en Colombia", CEDE-Universidad de los Andes. (2004): p. 4
11. n.a., "Why is less cocaine coming from Colombia?" *The Economist*, 03 Apr 2013. Accessed from: <http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explains-why-colombia-produces-less-cocaine> [28 Feb 2017]
12. Peceny Mark and Michael Durnan, "The FARC's Best Friend: U.S. Antidrug Policies and the Deepening of Colombia's Civil War in the 1990s". *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (2006): p. 95
13. López Monano Cecilia and Nicolás Cueter, "¿Por qué Santos sí pudo dialogar con las Farc?" *El Tiempo*, 30 Sep 2016. Accessed from: <http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/procesos-de-paz-en-colombia-44168> [17 Apr 2017]
14. n.a., "Colombia referendum: Voters reject Farc peace deal." BBC, 03 Oct 2016. Accessed from: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37537252> [01 May 2017]
15. n.a., "Qué dice de Colombia que haya habido 62% de abstención en el histórico plebiscito por el proceso de paz." BBC, 03 Oct 2016. Accessed from: <http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-37539590> [01 May 2017]
16. Investigación y Asesoría de Mercadeo (INVAMER), Encuesta de opinión nacional: plebiscito, document prepared for Caracol, Blu Radio and El Espectador, (Bogota: Sept 2016), p. 11 <http://media.caracoltv.co/Noticias/ENCUESTA%20GALLUP%20PLEBISCITO%20SEPTIEMBRE.pdf> [01 May 2017]
17. Leguizamo Camilo, Reflexiones sobre el proceso de paz del gobierno de Andrés PASTRANA y las FARC-Ep (1998-2002), document prepared for the Department of National Planning, (Bogota, 2002), p. 7
18. n.a., "Colombia referendum: Voters reject Farc peace deal." BBC, 03 Oct 2016. Accessed from: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37537252> [01 May 2017]
19. Partlow Joshua and Julia Symmes, "An end to Colombia's war seems close — except in rebel territory", *Washington Post*, 17 Oct 2015. Accessed from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/>



- world/the\_americas/an-end-to-colombias-war-seems-close-except-in-rebel-territory/2015/10/15/fa58c684-65dd-11e5-bdb6-6861f4521205\_story.html?utm\_term=.4175565bedbd [28 Feb 2017]
20. Vera Jose Maria. "Colombia: Esperanza, prudencia y riesgos" in Paz en Colombia: Perspectivas, desafíos y opciones, ed. Sara V. Alvarado, Eduardo A. Rueda & Pablo Gentili (Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2016), p. 228
21. Democracy Earth, "A Digital Referendum for Colombia's Diaspora." 04 Oct 2016. Accessed from: <https://words.democracy.earth/a-digital-referendum-for-colombias-diaspora-aeeef071ec014> [02 May 2017]
22. Idem.
23. n.a., "Colombia referendum: Voters reject Farc peace deal."
24. Investigación y Asesoría de Mercadeo (INVAMER), Encuesta de opinión nacional: plebiscito, p. 14
25. Herbolzheimer Kristian, Innovations in the Colombian peace process, Report for the Norwegian Peace Building Resource Centre, (Jun 2016): p. 9. Accessed from: [http://www.c-r.org/downloads/NOREF\\_CR\\_Report\\_Colombia%20Innovations\\_final.pdf](http://www.c-r.org/downloads/NOREF_CR_Report_Colombia%20Innovations_final.pdf) [03 May 2017]
26. McDermott Jeremy, "Colombia's 'No' Vote Leaves FARC in Dangerous Limbo", InSight Crime, 03 Oct 2016. Accessed from: <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/colombia-s-no-vote-leaves-farc-in-dangerous-limbo> [03 May 2017]
27. Castillejo-Cuéllar Alejandro, "El plebiscito como problema moral" in Paz en Colombia: Perspectivas, desafíos y opciones, ed. Sara V. Alvarado, Eduardo A. Rueda & Pablo Gentili (Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2016), p. 124
28. Restrepo J. Dario, "Colombia: Nota sobre los borradores de La Habana hasta ahora" in Paz en Colombia: Perspectivas, desafíos y opciones, ed. Sara V. Alvarado, Eduardo A. Rueda & Pablo Gentili (Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2016), p. 84
29. Galvis Miguel. "Votar sí en el plebiscito es la única opción que queda para decirle no a la impunidad" in Paz en Colombia: Perspectivas, desafíos y opciones, ed. Sara V. Alvarado, Eduardo A. Rueda & Pablo Gentili (Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2016), p. 141
30. Flórez Jose Fernando, "Manual para convencer los indecisos" in Paz en Colombia: Perspectivas, desafíos y opciones, ed. Sara V. Alvarado, Eduardo A. Rueda & Pablo Gentili (Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2016), p. 137
31. Goebertus Estrada Juanita, "¿Qué es cierto y qué es mito sobre el 'castrochavismo'?" El Tiempo, 01 Oct 2016. Accessed from: <http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/significado-del-castrochavismo-31515> [04 May 2017]
32. Caballero Antonio, "Las FARC sin la A" in Paz en Colombia: Perspectivas, desafíos y opciones, ed. Sara V. Alvarado, Eduardo A. Rueda & Pablo Gentili (Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2016), p. 194
33. Crisis Group Latin America, In the Shadow of "No": Peace after Colombia's Plebiscite, Report No 60, (Brussels: 31 Jan 2016): pp 3-4. Accessed from: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/060-shadow-no-peace-after-colombia-s-plebiscite> [05 May 2017]
34. Silva R. Ricardo, "Adiós, castrochavismo, adiós." El País, 29 Nov 2016. Accessed from: [http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2016/11/29/america/1480459497\\_431267.html](http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2016/11/29/america/1480459497_431267.html) [05 May 2017]
35. Cosoy Natalio, "El rol de las iglesias cristianas evangélicas en la victoria del 'No' en el plebiscito de Colombia" BBC, 05 Oct 2016. Accessed from: <http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-37560320> [05 May 2017]
36. Crisis Group Latin America, In the Shadow of "No": Peace after Colombia's Plebiscite, pp 5-8

*(This is an excerpt from my master thesis written at Collegium Civitas in Warsaw, Poland.*

*The text was adapted for the purpose of this article.)*

**\*Jovhanna Tovar** was born in Bogota and moved from Colombia to Austria sixteen years ago. Since completing her first academic degree in Business Administration at the International Management Center – FH Krems in 2008, she has been pursuing her personal and professional goals by working and living in different countries such as Australia, Fiji, Switzerland and Poland. In 2017, she finished her MA degree in International Relations at the Collegium Civitas University in Warsaw and is working for a global company in the finance industry. As an open and global minded person, she holds a profound interest in topics related to politics, international relations and intercultural communication, particularly related to Latin American and European countries.